Abstract
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology which is used to identify remote objects embedded with RFID tags by wireless scanning without manual intervention [1] . It has been used in various real-life applications such as supply chain management, security monitoring, e-payment system, citizen management, medical management. Because of gradually descending cost and more advantages, its use will increase with high speed in the future.
RFID technology can provide so many benefits for automatically identifying object items, however, based on special physical character such as wireless communication, signal broadcasting, there are many security and privacy problems in the existing RFID systems. However, due to strictly limited calculation resources, small storage capacity and faint power supply of low-cost tags, it is difficult to apply an ordinary and complicated but safe cryptographic algorithm to an RFID system and these factors are hindering the rapid spread of this technology [2] . So designing an efficient and low-cost RFID security scheme is a difficult and challenging object, it has attracted many researchers embarking on this task.
Except common security and privacy requirements, scalability is a desirable property in almost any system, enabling it to handle growing amounts of work in a graceful manner [3] . A scalable RFID system should have the ability of handling large numbers of tags without undue strain. However, for most of the proposed RFID authentication protocols, the backend server must perform a linear search(record by record lightweight encryption calculation and comparation) of its database to identify and authenticate a tag, such a linear search runs in O(n) time(n is the number of elements in the backend database). Such a costly search function will potentially cause scalability issues as the tag population increases [4] , so how to reduce time complexity of performing lightweight encryption calculation in the backend server becomes a significant object for the researchers.
Another requirement for RFID systems is secure tag ownership transfer. In some real-life applications, the owner of a RFID tag may change a number of times during its lifetime. Ownership transfer means that the server of the new owner takes over tag authorization, and so needs to be given the necessary private information to securely interact with and identify the tag. Thus all information associated with the tag will need to be passed from the old to the new owner [4] . Such transfer should meet requirement as follows, after tag ownership transfer, the older owner cannot read the tag using remained tag information so as to trace the new owner's behaviors, while the new owner cannot trace the old owner's past behaviors by using received tag information.
Especially, there is no universal applicable solution for RFID systems, the security levels depend on specific application. That is to say, RFID systems should attain balanced target between security and performance. The research object of RFID authentication protocols is using fewer resources to satisfy the same security requirements or achieving higher security levels by using the equal resources [5] .
The main contribution of this paper is to propose an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol supporting tag ownership transfer. In addition, this protocol only requires O(1) work to identify and authenticate a tag in the backend server and is suitable for the low-cost RFID systems because only one-way hash function, XOR operation and concatenation operation are needed in tags.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, the related research work is introduced; in the third section, a new efficient RFID authentication protocol supporting tag ownership transfer is proposed; in the fourth section, security and performance properties of the proposed protocol are analyzed; finally, the conclusion of this paper is generalized in the fifth section.
Related work
Presently, lightweight encryption methods such as Hash, PRNG(Pseudo Random Number Generator) and CRC(Cyclic Redundancy Code) are used wildly in design of RFID protocols. Especially, for achieving the balance between security and performance. Hash-based methods have been researched and used actively. For the aspect of security, a qualified RFID authentication protocol should meet common security requirements such as resisting spoofing attack, replay attack, DoS attack and meeting tag untraceability, tag information protection, forward security, and backward security. For the aspect of performance, because constraint limited resources on tag side, so storage cost, computation cost, traffic cost of a tag in a qualified RFID authentication protocol should be minimally controlled as minimally as possible.
According to whether the backend server and a tag update the identifier or not in an authentication access, RFID authentication protocols are divided into dynamic ID mechanism and static ID mechanism. Dynamic ID mechanism is always used in the circumstance that the ownership of ID is needed to transfer. Our research work in this paper is based on dynamic ID mechanism. Many authentication protocols based on dynamic ID mechanism have been proposed recently [4, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
In 2010, Zhou et al. proposed a lightweight anti-desynchronization RFID authentication protocol [12] , Let's introduce this authentication protocol detailedly as follows: The random number generated by the reader R The random number generated by the backend server Pre-x
The previous value of x Cur-x
The current value of x x i
The x value in the (i)th session of the protocol T Temporary value A→B:M A sends message M to B Figure 1 . The protocol proposed in [12] The (i+1)th authentication access is shown in Figure 1 , and detailed process as follows: Phase1: The reader generates a random number r and query tags with r. Phase2: After receiving r, a tag calculates M = H(T i ⊕r) and P = H(key i r M C), then sends IDS, M and P L back to the reader, subsequently the tag should calculate T i+1 = H(T i ⊕P R ) and save T i+1 in its memory. Especially, this protocol uses H(T i ⊕r) to substitute pseudo random number of the tag.
Phase3: After receiving IDS, M and P L from the tag, the reader would send r, IDS, M and P L to the backend server.
Phase4: After receiving authentication message from the reader, the backend server would search whether there exists certain IDS* in the column 'Cur-IDS' of the database, which could make H(Curkey*⊕r⊕M⊕C*) L = P L . If there exists such record, the tag would be considered as a legitimate tag, then the backend server would generate a random number R and calculate N = H(key i R M), subsequently send R, N R and Data* to the reader, then the backend server should calculate key i+1 = key i ⊕N L and update Pre-key = Cur-key, Cur-key = key i+1 , Pre-IDS = Cur-IDS, Cur-IDS = H(key i+1 ).
If there not exists certain IDS* in the column 'Cur-IDS' of the database, which could make H(Curkey*⊕r⊕M⊕C*) L = P L . The backend server should search whether there exists certain IDS* in column 'Pre-IDS' of the database, which could make H(Pre-key*⊕r⊕M⊕ID*) = P L . If there exists such record, the tag would be considered as a legitimate tag, but in the last authentication access, the tag has not updated its key and IDS successfully for some reason, so the backend server should generate a random number R and calculate N = H(key i ⊕R⊕M), then send R, N R and Data* to the reader, then the backend server should calculate key i+1 = key i ⊕N L and update Cur-key = key i+1 , Cur-IDS = H(key i+1 ) but Pre-key and Pre-IDS would keep unaltered.
If there not exists certain IDS* in column 'Cur-IDS' and column 'Pre-IDS' of the database like that, the tag would be considered as an illegitimate tag, the authentication is failed, failure information would be sent to the reader.
Phase5: After receiving R, N R and Data* from the backend server, the reader would store Data* in its memory and send R, N R to the tag. After receiving R, N R from the reader, the tag would calculate H(key i ⊕R⊕M), If the right part of calculation outcome equals to the received N R , then the object of mutual authentication achieves, the tag should update key i+1 = key i ⊕N L and IDS i+1 = H(key i+1 ), otherwise, the authentication is failed.
This protocol is an efficient and clear RFID authentication protocol, which only requires O(1) work to identify and authenticate a tag in the backend server by using RFID pseudonym scheme. However, there are some shortcomings of security and performance as follows:
(1)It does not meet tag untraceability. An adversary could recognize and locate a tag as follows, in the (i)th authentication access, in the phase2, the adversary could eavesdrop the responding message IDS i , M and P L through the backward channel, in the phase5, the adversary could intercept the message R, N R through the forward channel, so the tag could not update key i+1 = key i ⊕N L and IDS i+1 = H(key i+1 ) successfully in this access. Then the adversary could impersonate the legal reader and generate a random number r' and query tags with r', the tag would respond this query for its inherent nature and calculate M' = H(T i ⊕r'), P' = H(key i ⊕r'⊕M⊕C), then respond the query with IDS i , M' and P' L through the backward channel, because the adversary has acquired IDS i in the last authentication access, so the adversary could compare IDS i with the responding message from tags, if the message from any tag comprise IDS i , then the tag would be recognized and located, so this protocol does not meet tag untraceability that it has claimed. Tag untraceability is the most important requirement for a RFID system, so this protocol is not a qualified authentication protocol for this reason.
(2)Because this protocol is based on pseudonym scheme, so the pseudonym of each tag should be uniquely. In the process of generating IDS i+1 in the backend server, this protocol does not check new IDS i+1 whether equals to some value in column 'Cur-IDS' and column 'Pre-IDS'. If the value has existed in column 'Cur-IDS' or column 'Pre-IDS', new IDS i+1 being stored in the database without checking would lead to intending confusion.
(3)RFID tag has constraint requirements of limited resources, storage cost, computation cost, and traffic cost of each tag should be controlled as minimally as possible. This protocol stores key in a tag, it not only wastes storage resource of the tag but also leads to potential security risk. In addition, in the phase2, this protocol uses H(T i ⊕r) to substitute pseudo random number of a tag, and calculates T i+1 = H(T i ⊕P R ) and saves T i+1 in the tag's memory, as we know, if an adversary acquires H(), T i+1 would be calculated by the adversary easily, so the operation H() is not necessary for the calculation of T i+1 , it would increase computation cost of the tag.
In 2010, Luo et al. proposed a RFID security protocol based on dynamic ID mechanism [11] , which could support tag ownership transfer, however, there two problems in the protocol as follow:
(1)In the protocol, the backend server must perform the exhaustive linear search (record-by-record hash function calculation) to find the matching item. In each authentication access, the backend server averagely performs (n+1)/2 times hash operations to verify and authenticate a tag, such a linear search runs in O(n) time, where n is the number of elements in the database. Such a costly search function would potentially cause scalability issues as the amount of tags increases enormously.
(2)The protocol needs seven rounds to perform a whole verification and secret update process for each tag, it would not increase security of this protocol but lead to extra traffic cost.
Based on these two protocols, we proposed a new efficient RFID authentication protocol as follows: The x value in the (i)th session of this protocol A→B:M A sends message M to B
Initialization stage
The backend server and tags store information that required performing authentication. The backend server should generate a random secret key k j and calculate E kj (ID j ) for each tag, it initially stores ID j , Info j , Pre-key j (initial value is '0'), Cur-key j (initial value is k j ), Pre-IDS j (initial value is '0'), Cur-IDS j (initial value is E kj (ID j )) of each tag in its database. ID j , IDS(initial value is E kj (ID j )) and T 0 (initial value may be '0') would be set in the corresponding tag.
The (i +1)th authentication access
The new proposed protocol is shown in Figure 2 Phase4: After receiving authentication message from the reader, the backend server would calculate IDS = H(M L ‖R)⊕P, and search whether there exists certain IDS* in column 'Cur-IDS' of the database, which could make IDS = IDS*. If there exists such record, the tag would be considered as a legitimate tag, then the backend server should calculate key i+1 = Cur-key*⊕(R L ‖M L ) and IDS i+1 = E keyi+1 (ID*). In particular, after accomplishing these two calculations, the backend server must search whether there exists IDS' in column 'Pre-IDS' and column 'Cur-IDS', which could make IDS' = E keyi+1 (ID*). If there not exists such record, the backend server would calculate H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ) and N = H(M L ǁRǁIDS i ) IDS i+1 , then send Info*, H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ), N to the reader and update Pre-key = Cur-key, Cur-key = key i+1 , Pre-IDS = Cur-IDS, Cur-IDS = IDS i+1 ; if there exists such record, the backend server must generate such a random key' that could make the value which equals to E key' (ID*) could not be found in column 'Pre-IDS' and column 'Cur-IDS', then the backend server would calculate H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ) and N = H(M L ǁRǁIDS i ) IDS i+1 , then send Info*, H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ), N to the reader and update Pre-key = Cur-key, Cur-key = key', Pre-IDS = Cur-IDS, Cur-IDS = IDS i+1 = E key' (ID*) .
If there not exists certain IDS* in column 'Cur-key' of the database, which could make IDS = IDS*. The backend server would search whether there exists certain IDS* in column 'Pre-IDS' of the database, which could make IDS = IDS*. If there exists such record, the tag would be considered as a legitimate tag, but in the last authentication access, the tag has not updated key and IDS successfully for some reason, so the backend server calculates key i+1 = Pre-key*⊕(R L ‖M L ) and IDS i+1 = E keyi+1 (ID*). In particular, after accomplishing these two calculations, the backend server must search whether there exists IDS' in column 'Pre-IDS' and column 'Cur-IDS', which could make IDS' = E keyi+1 (ID*). If there not exists such record, the backend server would calculate H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ) and N = H(M L ǁRǁIDS i ) IDS i+1 , then send Info*, H(IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ), N to the reader and update Cur-key = key i+1 , Cur-IDS = E keyi+1 (ID*) but Pre-key and Pre-IDS would keep unaltered; if there exists such record, the backend server must generate such a random key' that would make the value which equals to E key' (ID*) could not be found in column 'Pre-IDS' and column 'Cur-IDS', then the backend server would calculate H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ) and N = H(M L ǁRǁIDS i ) IDS i+1 , and send Info*, H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ), N to the reader, then update Cur-key = key i+1 = key', Cur-IDS = E key' (ID*) but Pre-key and Pre-IDS would keep unaltered.
If there not exists certain IDS* in column 'Cur-key' and column 'Pre-key' of the database, which could make IDS = IDS*, the authentication is failed, F(failure information) would be sent to the reader.
Praiseworthily, in this phase, only one hash operation would be needed in verifying and authenticating a tag, so time complexity of hash function calculation achieves O(1).
Phase5: After receiving Info*, H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ), N from the backend server, the reader stores Info* in its memory and sends H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ), N to the tag. After receiving H L (IDS i+1 ǁIDS i ), N from the reader, the tag would calculate IDS" = (M L ‖R‖IDS i )⊕N, then calculate H L (IDS"‖IDS). If H L (IDS"‖IDS) equals to received H L (IDS i+1 ‖IDS i ), then the object of mutual authentication achieves, the tag should update IDS i+1 = IDS", otherwise, the authentication is failed.
The process of tag ownership transfer
Ownership transfer means that the server of the new owner takes over tag authorization, and securely interacts with and authenticates the tag instead of the server of the old owner. The process of tag ownership transfer as follows.
(1)The old owner of the tag should update k(Cur-key) to k1, IDS(Cur-IDS) to E k1 (ID) by executing an authentication access.
(2)The old owner sends (ID, Info, k1) to the new owner in security channel, because the new owner may use different encryption function from E k (), so E k1 (ID) is not necessary being transmitting from the older owner to the new owner. In addition, this transmission is implemented between a backend server to another backend server usually, so security scheme can use traditional symmetry encryption method.
.The older owner(A) should confer with the new owner(B) on symmetry secret key, A and B can perform security protocol like revised Needham-Schroeder protocol [13] to acquire symmetry secret key K AB .
.The old owner encrypts (ID, Info, k1) using K AB and sends encryption information to the new owner. .The new owner decrypts encryption information using K AB and gets (ID, Info, k1).
The new owner should update k1(Cur-key) to k2 and corresponding pseudonym by executing an authentication access. As a result, the old owner is no longer able to read the information of the tag, the ownership of the tag is transferred from the old owner to the new owner successfully. So it would protect the privacy of the new owner from the old owner of the tag. On the other hand, the new owner cannot trace previous transactions between the old owner and the tag since it only knows the updated k1, so it would protect the privacy of the old owner from the new owner of the tag. (2)Tag information protection Because the information of an ID(Info) is stored in the backend server and is transmitted through the secure channel from the backend server to the reader, an adversary cannot acquire Info. So this protocol can meet tag information protection.
(3)Spoofing attack An adversary feigns a legitimate reader that sends a query with R to tags through the forward channel, and obtains the response of a tag (H(M L ‖R)⊕IDS i , M L ). In the next authentication access, when a legitimate reader sends query with R', the adversary feigns the tag and responds the legitimate reader with the obtained message (H(M L ‖R)⊕IDS i , M L ) through the backward channel. However, the reader generates a new random number during each authentication access, namely R ≠ R', so the adversary cannot perform tag impersonation.
(4)Replay attack Replay attack can be prevented in this protocol due to the message transmitted for each session is different. Different value of H(M L ‖R) is utilized in individual session and T that stored in a tag plays a key role in providing different value of H(M L ‖R) to conceal pseudonym IDS of the tag. An adversary cannot hold H() and then acquire H(M L ‖R), so it is impossible for an adversary to apply replay attack.
(5)Denial of Service (DoS) attack As pseudonym IDS of a tag is mutative, even if loss of message, power failure or loss of connection with the backend server happens during an authentication access, it will lead to dy-synchronization between the backend server and the tag, this protocol can solve this problem in the next authentication access by searching pseudonym IDS in column 'Pre-IDS' and continuing the verification process. So this protocol can shield DoS attack well.
(6)Forward security. Both the backend server and a tag store pseudonym IDS, and update them in each authentication session. So forward security is assured because IDS has no relationship with previous sessions.
(7)Backward security. Both the backend server and the tag store pseudonym IDS, and update them in each authentication session, key is stored in the backend server only, and only the backend server hold E k (), an adversary cannot acquire E k (ID) and forecast the behavior of the tag in the intending authentication access. So this protocol can meet backward security. Table 3 indicates a comparison of results among our protocol and [11] , [12] in terms of security. 
Performance evaluations
Storage cost: a tag only stores ID, IDS and temporary value T in its memory, so this protocol can meet the storage constraints in a low-cost RFID environment.
Computational cost: in this protocol, only hash operation, XOR calculation and concatenation operation are used in tags, without pseudo random number generator used because of hardware cost, so this protocol can satisfy the restriction of the computational cost very well.
Traffic cost: this protocol needs five rounds to perform an authentication access, and the efficiency of the transmission and communication cost has been economized well.
Workload of the backend server: in the backend server, only one hash operation is needed for verifying and authenticating a tag, the backend server performs a constant time search to find the match item, so this protocol has well scalability and is very suitable to managing large population of tags. Table 4 indicates a comparison of results among our protocol and [11] , [12] in terms of performance. 
Conclusion
RFID systems suffer from many privacy and security problems, and scalability becomes an important requirement gradually. Therefore, in this paper, a new efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol supporting tag ownership transfer is proposed, this protocol only requires O(1) work to identify and authenticate a tag in the backend server, it alleviates workload of the backend server sharply, so this protocol has well scalability and is very suitable to managing large population of tags. The careful security analysis shows that this protocol can resist spoofing attack, replay attack, DoS attack, and meet tag untraceability, tag information protection, forward security and backward security; the performance evaluations show that this protocol is suitable for low-cost RFID systems well.
